two types of pseudoscience
by sam smith
In his book, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Karl Popper, proposed a (for the time) radical new understanding of science, human learning, and empirical knowledge. Far from the then near-universally accepted theories of scientific discovery and knowledge proposed by the likes of David Hume and Francis Bacon, in which all knowledge is created by the repeated observation of similar confirmatory patterns in nature, and scientific knowledge (this context of the term, importantly, does not include mathematics) is unique and reliable for the sole reason of its inductive method of building theories from these observed patterns, that is to say, from the way in which it generalizes many instances of similar events happening in similar ways. The consequence and counter to this belief was, as ironically raised by David Hume himself, what is commonly known as The Problem of Induction. Simply put, it is the fact that there is no logical basis for the claim that events in the future will occur in exactly the same way, following the exact same progress, as similar events in the past. Popper, on the other hand, saw this line of reasoning about the growth and uniqueness of scientific knowledge as completely invalid, and having dangerous implications, namely, that many branches of what he calls “pseudo-science”, such as Marxism, Astrology, Freudian psychoanalysis, Divination, et cetera, possess the same logical validity as what Popper calls ‘truly scientific’ beliefs, such as the laws of gravitation and motion, evolutionary theory, general and special relativity, et cetera. In order to distinguish these two categories, and at least partially rid science of the stain caused by the problem of induction, Popper proposed an alternative explanation for the methods of gaining both scientific and general knowledge.
As Popper accurately points out, the type of unthinking observation as a method of gaining knowledge, the theory proposed by Hume and then-current epistemological canon, does not fit with the actual way humans gain knowledge. He means this in the way that, without some sort of pre-considered goal in mind, some general theory about reality humans wish to “test”, observation is not possible. As Popper puts it, “the instruction ‘Observe!’ is absurd” (21). In the process of gaining knowledge, Popper says, human beings jump to (sometimes senseless in hindsight) universalizing conclusions about patterns in reality, and use empirical observations to falsify those theories. This idea essentially flips the Humean and Baconian conceptions of knowledge and science, as it turns the basic process of knowledge from inductive observation creating and verifying general theory, to a general theory being falsified by observation. In its own way, Popper’s theory brings back the age-old Platonian assertion of deductive knowledge (although it is still, unlike Plato’s theory, based in empiricism). Thus, the difference between science and pseudo-science is, as Popper claims, that scientific theories are what he calls “prohibitive”, meaning that there exists a set of empirical data which can falsify them (they prohibit certain observations from occurring), but pseudo-scientific theories do not have this limit, they are, in Popper’s own terminology, unfalsifiable (lacking an observation or set of observations which would conclusively disprove them); in other words, pseudo-scientific theories cannot be falsified by any conceivable set of data, realistic or not.
However, Popper’s pseudo-science, as he defines it, cannot contain, contrary to what he asserts, any of the practices he claims it to. The category of Popperian “pseudoscience” can be subdivided into two types of theories, neither belong in the category, as he defines it. The first of these categories is what will be called ‘interpretive pseudoscience’ (a.k.a. mysticism), which includes practices such as astrology, tarot card reading, and divination. This category is defined by a broad general assertion, which practitioners use to make very specific positive assertions about future events, often as they relate to the life of an individual. Interpretive systems are not attempts to ultimately explain reality, but are interpretive (as the name suggests), they make no claims to final, ultimate, descriptive systems. In other words, the individual assertions made under these systems have no relation to the general assertion except as a lens through which to interpret (not explain) individual observations (e.g. a tarot card reader makes no claim that their cards are the sole thing determining the future of reality). The assertions made in the other category of pseudoscience, what I call ‘universal-extrapolative pseudoscience’ are, on the other hand, fundamentally explanatory. universal-extrapolative pseudoscience is defined by taking a legitimate and logical lens of causation through which to view reality (e.g. the means of production as used by Marxists, the unconscious mind as used by Freudians, etc.), and extrapolating from that create an ultimate system in which those causes are the only causes in reality. In other words, history is full of conflicts over the means of production/class conflicts (e.g. The French Revolution(s)), but many events in history (such as the German Peasants’ Rebellion, or the Protestant reformation in general) cannot be ultimately or (rarely) even partially explained by these conflicts. Both of these practices arise out of, just as Popper says scientific ones do, a wild extrapolation of confirming empirical patterns, and also possess, just as Popper claims of legitimate scientific theories, certain observations which would conclusively falsify their claims about reality. In other words, they are both falsifiable.
One example of such a situation which would present falsifying data, using an interpretive system, would be if an astrologer I went to predicts that, because Jupiter is in ascension in early May, I, a taurus, will experience good fortune on the day of my birth; and, on May 10th, my birthday, I am struck by a bus and instantly killed, conclusively proving that astrologer, and all of astrology, incapable of foreseeing incredibly significant future events. Yet even with the ability of the theory to be falsified in this manner, Popper still classifies it as unfalsifiable pseudoscience. The “risky leaps” that are necessary under Popper’s system for a theory to be scientific do exist in interpretive systems, taking the form of positive, certain assertions about the future (e.g. “Yes, you will get the job, Venus is in the seventh house”).
Another example of this falsifiability, this time using a universal-extrapolative system, would be the Marxist assertion that all causes relate back to the means of production. (It must be specified here that when the term ‘Marxism’ is used I mean the later Marxism of the Soviets, in which the determining factor of all historical events is solely material) This claim, contrary to Popper, does make a risky prediction, namely, that there has not nor will ever be a conflict which cannot be reduced to its material causes. However, when one looks at history, many such conflicts arise, conflicts which arise more from what Marx terms the reflective (of material causes) ‘superstructure’ of society (laws, culture, religion, etc.) than his supposed ‘base’ (the means of production). [Note: This distinction matters more to the marxism of Marx than the Marxism of his followers, the Marxism this example is falsifying]. One example which comes to mind is the relatively recent Rwandan genocide and civil war. While the Tutsi rebellion can be traced back to Hutu governmental domination (which can in turn be traced back to colonialism, and thus, economics), the Hutu oppression of the Tutsi people, the key factor, anogalous (in this sense) to any rivalry or feud between peoples, can be traced back to no other source than cultural conflict. With this in mind, it is obvious that, contrary to Marxist thought, the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples was one of culture, not economics. Popperians, and Popper himself, may try and argue that, under both systems of pseudoscientific thought, theories are “re-interpreted... in order to make them agree [with falsifying evidence]”. However, as Popper himself admits, the followers of many disproven scientific theories make this same error in judgement, modifying their own once-scientific theories in order to cope with falsifying evidence.
In both these examples, the theory which Popper terms ‘unfalsifiable’ is, in fact, falsified. So then, the question remains, what is the distinction between science and pseudoscience? I posit that the distinction, far from being one of methodology of development, is in fact one of the error of the practitioners. Every theory which Popper calls pseudoscientific, from Divination to Adlerian psychoanalysis, was developed through scientific methods: the creation of a theory from empirical observations, and limiting that theory enough to admit possible falsifying results. This means that, while Popper is right in that falsifiability is the true test of a scientific belief, and that things like Marxism and astrology are not of the same rigor as, say, the theory of general relativity, they are (or at one point were) science. These theories lack of truth and rigor is not due to some sort of unfalsifiability, it is due to their adherents manipulating falsifying data or ignoring it entirely, their logic both dogmatic and formless. The chief division which separates science and pseudo-science is not an issue of categorical definitions or verifiability, it is one of human error. Pseudo-scientific theories are theories whose practitioners lack the mental grounding to anchor their theories to a definite, unchanging set of falsifying data, yet whose own personal worldview is too grounded and dogmatic, lacking the ability to shift perspective away from a lens of a disproven theory.
As Popper accurately points out, the type of unthinking observation as a method of gaining knowledge, the theory proposed by Hume and then-current epistemological canon, does not fit with the actual way humans gain knowledge. He means this in the way that, without some sort of pre-considered goal in mind, some general theory about reality humans wish to “test”, observation is not possible. As Popper puts it, “the instruction ‘Observe!’ is absurd” (21). In the process of gaining knowledge, Popper says, human beings jump to (sometimes senseless in hindsight) universalizing conclusions about patterns in reality, and use empirical observations to falsify those theories. This idea essentially flips the Humean and Baconian conceptions of knowledge and science, as it turns the basic process of knowledge from inductive observation creating and verifying general theory, to a general theory being falsified by observation. In its own way, Popper’s theory brings back the age-old Platonian assertion of deductive knowledge (although it is still, unlike Plato’s theory, based in empiricism). Thus, the difference between science and pseudo-science is, as Popper claims, that scientific theories are what he calls “prohibitive”, meaning that there exists a set of empirical data which can falsify them (they prohibit certain observations from occurring), but pseudo-scientific theories do not have this limit, they are, in Popper’s own terminology, unfalsifiable (lacking an observation or set of observations which would conclusively disprove them); in other words, pseudo-scientific theories cannot be falsified by any conceivable set of data, realistic or not.
However, Popper’s pseudo-science, as he defines it, cannot contain, contrary to what he asserts, any of the practices he claims it to. The category of Popperian “pseudoscience” can be subdivided into two types of theories, neither belong in the category, as he defines it. The first of these categories is what will be called ‘interpretive pseudoscience’ (a.k.a. mysticism), which includes practices such as astrology, tarot card reading, and divination. This category is defined by a broad general assertion, which practitioners use to make very specific positive assertions about future events, often as they relate to the life of an individual. Interpretive systems are not attempts to ultimately explain reality, but are interpretive (as the name suggests), they make no claims to final, ultimate, descriptive systems. In other words, the individual assertions made under these systems have no relation to the general assertion except as a lens through which to interpret (not explain) individual observations (e.g. a tarot card reader makes no claim that their cards are the sole thing determining the future of reality). The assertions made in the other category of pseudoscience, what I call ‘universal-extrapolative pseudoscience’ are, on the other hand, fundamentally explanatory. universal-extrapolative pseudoscience is defined by taking a legitimate and logical lens of causation through which to view reality (e.g. the means of production as used by Marxists, the unconscious mind as used by Freudians, etc.), and extrapolating from that create an ultimate system in which those causes are the only causes in reality. In other words, history is full of conflicts over the means of production/class conflicts (e.g. The French Revolution(s)), but many events in history (such as the German Peasants’ Rebellion, or the Protestant reformation in general) cannot be ultimately or (rarely) even partially explained by these conflicts. Both of these practices arise out of, just as Popper says scientific ones do, a wild extrapolation of confirming empirical patterns, and also possess, just as Popper claims of legitimate scientific theories, certain observations which would conclusively falsify their claims about reality. In other words, they are both falsifiable.
One example of such a situation which would present falsifying data, using an interpretive system, would be if an astrologer I went to predicts that, because Jupiter is in ascension in early May, I, a taurus, will experience good fortune on the day of my birth; and, on May 10th, my birthday, I am struck by a bus and instantly killed, conclusively proving that astrologer, and all of astrology, incapable of foreseeing incredibly significant future events. Yet even with the ability of the theory to be falsified in this manner, Popper still classifies it as unfalsifiable pseudoscience. The “risky leaps” that are necessary under Popper’s system for a theory to be scientific do exist in interpretive systems, taking the form of positive, certain assertions about the future (e.g. “Yes, you will get the job, Venus is in the seventh house”).
Another example of this falsifiability, this time using a universal-extrapolative system, would be the Marxist assertion that all causes relate back to the means of production. (It must be specified here that when the term ‘Marxism’ is used I mean the later Marxism of the Soviets, in which the determining factor of all historical events is solely material) This claim, contrary to Popper, does make a risky prediction, namely, that there has not nor will ever be a conflict which cannot be reduced to its material causes. However, when one looks at history, many such conflicts arise, conflicts which arise more from what Marx terms the reflective (of material causes) ‘superstructure’ of society (laws, culture, religion, etc.) than his supposed ‘base’ (the means of production). [Note: This distinction matters more to the marxism of Marx than the Marxism of his followers, the Marxism this example is falsifying]. One example which comes to mind is the relatively recent Rwandan genocide and civil war. While the Tutsi rebellion can be traced back to Hutu governmental domination (which can in turn be traced back to colonialism, and thus, economics), the Hutu oppression of the Tutsi people, the key factor, anogalous (in this sense) to any rivalry or feud between peoples, can be traced back to no other source than cultural conflict. With this in mind, it is obvious that, contrary to Marxist thought, the conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples was one of culture, not economics. Popperians, and Popper himself, may try and argue that, under both systems of pseudoscientific thought, theories are “re-interpreted... in order to make them agree [with falsifying evidence]”. However, as Popper himself admits, the followers of many disproven scientific theories make this same error in judgement, modifying their own once-scientific theories in order to cope with falsifying evidence.
In both these examples, the theory which Popper terms ‘unfalsifiable’ is, in fact, falsified. So then, the question remains, what is the distinction between science and pseudoscience? I posit that the distinction, far from being one of methodology of development, is in fact one of the error of the practitioners. Every theory which Popper calls pseudoscientific, from Divination to Adlerian psychoanalysis, was developed through scientific methods: the creation of a theory from empirical observations, and limiting that theory enough to admit possible falsifying results. This means that, while Popper is right in that falsifiability is the true test of a scientific belief, and that things like Marxism and astrology are not of the same rigor as, say, the theory of general relativity, they are (or at one point were) science. These theories lack of truth and rigor is not due to some sort of unfalsifiability, it is due to their adherents manipulating falsifying data or ignoring it entirely, their logic both dogmatic and formless. The chief division which separates science and pseudo-science is not an issue of categorical definitions or verifiability, it is one of human error. Pseudo-scientific theories are theories whose practitioners lack the mental grounding to anchor their theories to a definite, unchanging set of falsifying data, yet whose own personal worldview is too grounded and dogmatic, lacking the ability to shift perspective away from a lens of a disproven theory.